62 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown
62 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown
# Execution safety and reliability
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## Artifact trust boundary
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Generated files are untrusted input, not application code. Artifact responses
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carry a CSP sandbox with no script, form, or connection permission, plus
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`nosniff` and `private, no-store`. This applies to direct/raw links as well as
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embedded previews. Inline CSS and same-origin/data images remain readable;
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interactive HTML applications are deliberately not supported as trusted reports.
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The opt-in scratch-browser regression is:
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```sh
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PIPELINES_BROWSER_TEST=1 go test ./internal/server -run TestArtifactHTMLBrowserIsolation -v
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```
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It serves a malicious fixture from an ephemeral server and checks that the report
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remains readable without executing its script or contacting the control origin.
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It never uses a deployed server or model.
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## Definition publication is a server capability
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The server defaults to execution-only. Browsing and validation are read-only;
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publication via `submit`, import, template creation, or raw RPC is refused unless
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the operator starts the server with `-allow-authoring` (also accepted through
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`pipelines serve`). No client `--yes` flag can enable this capability.
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Enable it deliberately for authorized definition changes, preferably in a
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separate trusted authoring deployment; leave it disabled for execution workers.
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This is a deployment-level gate, not a claim that a program can infer human
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intent. An enabled authoring server still trusts its authenticated operator.
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An agent with the operator's full OS authority can alter configuration or access
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the database: preventing that requires an actual OS/service identity boundary,
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not more command-string patterns. Do not give execution agents the authoring
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service's credentials or database access.
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## Shell tools are trusted local execution
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Tool declarations, edit paths, and protected-file read rules are useful controls,
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but an arbitrary shell is not a filesystem jail. Programs launched by the shell
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can use the host user's permissions, credentials, and network. Use a dedicated
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unprivileged account, VM, or container with an explicit workspace mount for
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untrusted definitions. Do not advertise prompt instructions as sandboxing.
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## Lost run-start replies
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The web Run dialog saves one immutable launch payload and request key in tab
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storage before sending it. An uncertain launch is not automatically replayed.
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`Check / retry` first uses the read-only `get_run` command with `request_key`;
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if admitted, it opens that exact run, even if it already finished. Otherwise it
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resends the original intent with the same key. Changing the task requires first
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resolving admission; an explicit refusal is editable only after that lookup
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confirms no run exists. A page reload and reopening the same pipeline/version
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recovers the pending intent on the same endpoint.
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## Delivery discipline
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Checks and browser probes use scratch databases and loopback ports. Installing
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changes and restarting shared services are separate operator actions; restarts
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must not be used to test cancellation or recover a run while unrelated work is
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active. Preserve existing sessions, outputs, branches, and database backups.
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