# Execution safety and reliability ## Artifact trust boundary Generated files are untrusted input, not application code. Artifact responses carry a CSP sandbox with no script, form, or connection permission, plus `nosniff` and `private, no-store`. This applies to direct/raw links as well as embedded previews. Inline CSS and same-origin/data images remain readable; interactive HTML applications are deliberately not supported as trusted reports. The opt-in scratch-browser regression is: ```sh PIPELINES_BROWSER_TEST=1 go test ./internal/server -run TestArtifactHTMLBrowserIsolation -v ``` It serves a malicious fixture from an ephemeral server and checks that the report remains readable without executing its script or contacting the control origin. It never uses a deployed server or model. ## Definition publication is a server capability The server defaults to execution-only. Browsing and validation are read-only; publication via `submit`, import, template creation, or raw RPC is refused unless the operator starts the server with `-allow-authoring` (also accepted through `pipelines serve`). No client `--yes` flag can enable this capability. Enable it deliberately for authorized definition changes, preferably in a separate trusted authoring deployment; leave it disabled for execution workers. This is a deployment-level gate, not a claim that a program can infer human intent. An enabled authoring server still trusts its authenticated operator. An agent with the operator's full OS authority can alter configuration or access the database: preventing that requires an actual OS/service identity boundary, not more command-string patterns. Do not give execution agents the authoring service's credentials or database access. ## Shell tools are trusted local execution Tool declarations, edit paths, and protected-file read rules are useful controls, but an arbitrary shell is not a filesystem jail. Programs launched by the shell can use the host user's permissions, credentials, and network. Use a dedicated unprivileged account, VM, or container with an explicit workspace mount for untrusted definitions. Do not advertise prompt instructions as sandboxing. ## Lost run-start replies The web Run dialog saves one immutable launch payload and request key in tab storage before sending it. An uncertain launch is not automatically replayed. `Check / retry` first uses the read-only `get_run` command with `request_key`; if admitted, it opens that exact run, even if it already finished. Otherwise it resends the original intent with the same key. Changing the task requires first resolving admission; an explicit refusal is editable only after that lookup confirms no run exists. A page reload and reopening the same pipeline/version recovers the pending intent on the same endpoint. ## Delivery discipline Checks and browser probes use scratch databases and loopback ports. Installing changes and restarting shared services are separate operator actions; restarts must not be used to test cancellation or recover a run while unrelated work is active. Preserve existing sessions, outputs, branches, and database backups.