39 lines
2.5 KiB
Markdown
39 lines
2.5 KiB
Markdown
# Browser discovery and simultaneous server connections
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The server adds a bounded `discover_servers` RPC and local `/discovery` HTTP
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handler using its existing mDNS dependency. Advertisements are validated, sorted
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and deduplicated; only valid Pipelines `/connect` records are returned. The web
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front door exposes this as authenticated `GET /api/discovery`. This searches the
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hosting machine's LAN, which can differ from the browser's current network.
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For browser federation, authenticated same-origin `POST /api/peers/:serverId`
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accepts `{endpoints:[wsURLs],password?:string}` and responds with `connected`,
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`needs_password`, and successful `connected_endpoints`. It signs into each remote
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machine directly, retaining cookies only in proxy memory, scoped to the local
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login session, server id and exact registered alias. `DELETE` revokes that server.
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A proxy restart requires signing into remote peers again; remote harness sessions
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and background work are independent and are not stopped by this relay.
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The browser opens `/peers/:serverId/connect?endpoint=<original ws URL>` and reads
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files/artifacts/updates or uploads through `/peers/:serverId/<resource>`, using the
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same optional `endpoint` query. These are same-origin paths, so HTTPS browsers can
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reach trusted LAN servers without cross-origin cookies or mixed-content sockets.
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Local browser cookies and Origin are never forwarded to remote machines; only the
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selected peer's exact stored credential is used. No redirects are followed, no
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remote Set-Cookie is exposed, and proxying is limited to registered endpoints and
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known application resource paths. Mutating registration calls require same Origin
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and JSON, and all endpoints remain behind the local login gate.
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New local sessions have unique nonce-bearing signed cookies, while existing
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legacy cookies remain valid. Profile edits revoke previous aliases immediately;
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registration generations prevent late responses resurrecting deleted profiles.
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Failed reauthentication to an unchanged profile preserves its existing cookie and
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websocket. Expired owner records close their sockets and are pruned before limits.
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Verification: all 13 Node tests passed, including isolated real HTTP/WS peers,
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per-browser and per-server cookie isolation, scoped files and websocket routing,
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authenticated discovery, revocation races, failed sign-in preservation, and owner
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expiry cleanup. Go discovery/protocol/server tests and focused vet passed. All
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fixtures used loopback/scratch state; no operator sessions, passwords, deployments
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or workflows were changed. Parent owns Flutter integration and delivery.
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