The proxy forwards an HMAC-derived session id (X-Pipelines-Session) on
/connect and POST /files; the server trusts it only on token-authenticated
requests and keys elevation by it, so reconnects stay elevated up to a 24 h
cap. Terminals rely on their su -l login. The app no longer forgets the
elevation on disconnect and asks again only on a fresh refusal.
The __Host- session cookie name now goes to browsers only. Native clients
(no Origin or fetch metadata), including app builds from before the change,
get the plain cookie name, still Secure over https, so they find their
session after signing in.
Store a scrypt hash (migrating a plaintext password without changing it),
sign sessions with a generation that ./password and --revoke-all rotate,
make logout a same-origin POST that revokes the token, add sign out everywhere,
and close proxied websockets whose session ends. Enforce a strength rule for
new passwords, back off logins per client and server-wide, check Origin on
login, tighten next, add security headers and a __Host- cookie over https.
The web proxy binds the wildcard and drops connections that are not
loopback or Tailscale at both ends. A LAN listener is opt-in (web.lan) and
refuses sign-in and signed-in pages over plain HTTP unless
web.lan_plain_login is set. Existing installs keep their bind address with
a warning. Without the LAN the mDNS advert carries only the tailnet and
public routes (lan=0).
The proxy adds the shared token to every upstream request and drops any
client copy. The peer relay accepts only tailnet, LAN, ts.net and discovered
hosts, resolves each name once and pins the checked address, and flags
ws:// endpoints with insecure_transport.
The direct proxy already forwards every /files method behind the sign-in
gate; the peer relay now allows POST /files beside /chat-uploads. Tests cover
the name header, body and refusal of other POST targets.