Files
pipelines/docs/notes/network-and-update-signing.md
T
alan 9f38e38f6a Sign the app update feed with Ed25519 and verify it in the app
Each installation generates a private Ed25519 key once (0600, under
~/.config/pipelines), signs version.json with a detached version.json.sig
when publishing APK and desktop builds, and embeds its own and listed
trusted public keys in app builds. The app verifies the feed signature
before trusting the artifact sha256, refuses unsigned or foreign feeds when
it has keys, and requires the sha256 and Android signer in signed feeds.
2026-11-10 00:51:16 +00:00

7.0 KiB

Network defaults and update-feed signing

Update feed signing

Before this change the app trusted whatever /updates/ served: the Linux self-update installed and relaunched an archive whose sha256 came from the same version.json, Android skipped its signer check when the feed omitted the field, and the macOS zip had no check beyond that sha256. A server (or anyone able to write its update directory, or answer for its address) could hand every client another build.

What is signed

  • Publishing (./install --apk, ./install --linux|--macos --publish) writes version.json and, beside it, a detached version.json.sig: {"algorithm":"ed25519","publicKey":"<base64 32 bytes>","signature":"<base64 64 bytes>"}. The signature covers the exact bytes of version.json, which carry the artifact sha256 (and, for Android, signingCertificateSha256). The signature is written first, then the feed, both atomically; a check racing a publish fails once and succeeds on the next check.
  • Code: scripts/update_signing.py (keys, signing, publish_feed), scripts/app_build.py (build_apk, web and desktop defines), scripts/app_desktop_build.py (publish_desktop(..., signer=...)).

Key management

  • Each installation has one Ed25519 key in ~/.config/pipelines/update-signing-key.pem (mode 0600, directory 0700), generated once on the first ./install or app build/publish and never replaced. PIPELINES_UPDATE_SIGNING_KEY names another path. A key file that is a symlink or readable by others is refused. It is never in the repository. scripts/uninstall.py (full reset) removes ~/.config/pipelines, and so the key; see "Lost or replaced key" below.
  • Cryptography is the OpenSSL 3 command line (genpkey, pkey, pkeyutl -sign -rawin). The installer's Python has no cryptography package, and macOS's /usr/bin/openssl is LibreSSL 3.3.6, which has no Ed25519 (unable to load Private Key). The tool is chosen as PIPELINES_OPENSSL, then /opt/homebrew/opt/openssl@3/bin/openssl, /usr/local/opt/openssl@3/bin/openssl, then openssl on PATH, taking the first that can generate an Ed25519 key. Without one the install stops with Update signing needs OpenSSL 3 with Ed25519 ... (brew install openssl@3). On this Mac openssl on PATH is Homebrew OpenSSL 3.6.4.
  • Print this installation's public key: python3 scripts/update_signing.py.

Trust model

  • Every app build embeds the keys it trusts as --dart-define=PIPELINES_UPDATE_PUBLIC_KEY=<key>[,<key>...] (apk, linux, macos and web builds; the define is part of the build cache key, so a key change rebuilds). The list is this installation's own key first, then each base64 key in ~/.config/pipelines/update-trusted-keys (one per line, # comments allowed; a malformed line stops the build).
  • Each server signs its own feed with its own key. A client accepts a feed only when version.json.sig names an embedded key and the signature over the served bytes verifies with it; the client checks the signature before it believes anything in the feed. So an app built on the Mac updates from tank only if tank's key was listed in the Mac's update-trusted-keys when that app was built (and vice versa). There is no trust-on-first-use pinning: trust comes only from the build, which keeps the model to one rule.
  • With keys embedded, the app refuses: an unsigned feed (no .sig), an unreadable signature, a key it does not embed, a bad signature, a feed without sha256, and an Android feed without signingCertificateSha256 (or when the installed signature is unknown). The Android certificate must still match the installed app's, as before.
  • A build with no embedded key (a developer flutter run/flutter build outside the installer) keeps the previous unsigned behaviour. Installer builds always embed a key.
  • Verification in the app is pure Dart (app/lib/features/updates/ed25519.dart, RFC 8032 verify only, BigInt arithmetic, checked against RFC 8032 test vectors 1-3; no new package) and app/lib/features/updates/update_feed_signature.dart; the reader is fetchLatestScoped in app_updates_io.dart. The web Settings "Android download" link is a browser download the operator installs by hand and is unchanged.

Migration (the live Mac install and tank)

Not done by this change; nothing was deployed. In order, on each machine:

  1. ./install (or the next ./install --apk / desktop publish) generates ~/.config/pipelines/update-signing-key.pem. Check: ls -l ~/.config/pipelines/update-signing-key.pem shows -rw-------.
  2. To let one machine's apps update from the other, exchange keys before building: on tank run python3 scripts/update_signing.py and append the line to the Mac's ~/.config/pipelines/update-trusted-keys; do the reverse on tank. Skip this if each machine's apps only update from it.
  3. Rebuild and publish: ./install --apk, ./install --macos --publish --flutter <flutter>, ./install --linux --publish. Each feed directory then holds version.json.sig.
  4. Installed apps from before this change do not check signatures; they take the next signed release normally (the .sig is ignored), and from then on they refuse unsigned or foreign feeds. Phones whose feed came from the other machine need step 2 before step 3.
  5. Lost or replaced key (for example after a full uninstall): apps built with the old key refuse the new feeds. Install the new build once by hand (APK download from Settings in the browser, or the desktop archive), or restore the old key file from backup.

Verification output

  • cd scripts && python3 -m unittest test_update_signing test_app_build test_app_desktop_build test_setup_native: Ran 81 tests ... OK. Covers key generation once at 0600 in a scratch HOME, refusal of readable/symlinked keys, LibreSSL-style tools skipped, signatures checked independently with openssl pkeyutl -verify (and a tampered message refused), feed plus .sig publication, trusted-key list parsing, APK publication signed with the generated key, desktop publication passing the exact feed bytes to the signer, and the committed Dart fixture being a valid OpenSSL signature.
  • cd app && tool/memwatch/full.sh 'test/features/updates test/features/settings': memwatch: PASS: 187 passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped. New: test/features/updates/ed25519_test.dart (RFC 8032 vectors; changed message, signature, key; short inputs; S >= L; non-canonical key) and test/features/updates/update_feed_signature_test.dart (the Python-signed fixture test/features/updates/fixtures/signed_feed/ verifies; tampered feed and signature refused; missing signature refused with keys, accepted without; untrusted and swapped keys refused; signed feeds require sha256 and the Android signer; and the HTTP reader fetchLatestScoped against a loopback server refuses an unsigned and a tampered feed and lets the genuine one past the signature check). test/core/session: PASS: 18 passed. tool/analyze.sh: analyze: clean.