d55e1e7162
The __Host- session cookie name now goes to browsers only. Native clients (no Origin or fetch metadata), including app builds from before the change, get the plain cookie name, still Secure over https, so they find their session after signing in.
83 lines
3.5 KiB
JavaScript
83 lines
3.5 KiB
JavaScript
// Browser-facing hygiene for the proxy: request origin checks, the post-login
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// redirect target, the session cookie's name and the security headers.
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import { sameOriginUpgrade } from "./proxySecurity.js";
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export const SESSION_COOKIE = "pipelines_session";
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/** Over https the cookie is host-locked (Secure, Path=/, no Domain). */
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export const HOST_SESSION_COOKIE = "__Host-pipelines_session";
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/** Whether the browser reached the proxy over https (Tailscale serve). */
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export function isHttps(req) {
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const forwarded = String(req.headers["x-forwarded-proto"] ?? "").split(",")[0].trim().toLowerCase();
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return forwarded === "https" || Boolean(req.socket?.encrypted);
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}
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/** Whether the request comes from a browser (they send fetch metadata or an
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* Origin on a form POST); the native app, curl and peer proxies send neither. */
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export function isBrowserRequest(req) {
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return Boolean(req.headers["sec-fetch-site"] || req.headers.origin);
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}
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/** Browsers over https get the host-locked `__Host-` cookie. Native clients
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* keep the plain name (still Secure over https): installed app builds from
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* before the `__Host-` cookie only read that name, and a native client has no
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* other site sharing its cookie jar, which is what `__Host-` guards against. */
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export function sessionCookieName(req) {
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return isHttps(req) && isBrowserRequest(req) ? HOST_SESSION_COOKIE : SESSION_COOKIE;
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}
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/**
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* Whether a state-changing request comes from this origin. Browsers send
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* Origin on every POST; a native client (the app, curl, a peer proxy) sends
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* none and has no ambient cookies to abuse. `Origin: null` and a cross-site
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* Sec-Fetch-Site are refused.
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*/
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export function sameOriginRequest(req) {
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const origin = req.headers.origin;
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const site = req.headers["sec-fetch-site"];
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if (site && !["same-origin", "none"].includes(String(site))) return false;
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if (origin === undefined) return true;
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return sameOriginUpgrade(origin, req.headers.host);
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}
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/**
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* The local path to return to after signing in: one "/" followed by anything
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* but "/" or "\" (which browsers treat as another host), no backslashes or
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* control characters anywhere, else "/".
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*/
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export function safeNext(value) {
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const next = String(value ?? "");
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if (next.length > 2048 || !/^\/(?![/\\])/.test(next) || /[\\\u0000-\u001f\u007f]/.test(next)) return "/";
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return next;
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}
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/** The proxy's own pages (sign-in, sign-out) are never framed and run no script. */
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export const PAGE_POLICY =
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"default-src 'none'; img-src 'self'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; form-action 'self'; " +
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"frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'none'";
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/**
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* Headers every response starts with. The app frames only its own documents
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* (sandboxed srcdoc HTML previews), so same-origin framing stays allowed; a
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* response that sets its own value (for example a sandboxing CSP) overrides
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* these at writeHead. HSTS only on https.
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*/
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export function applySecurityHeaders(req, res) {
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res.setHeader("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff");
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res.setHeader("Referrer-Policy", "same-origin");
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res.setHeader("X-Frame-Options", "SAMEORIGIN");
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res.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", "frame-ancestors 'self'");
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if (isHttps(req)) res.setHeader("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=31536000");
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}
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/** Marks a response as one of the proxy's own pages. */
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export function pageHeaders(extra = {}) {
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return {
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"Content-Type": "text/html; charset=utf-8",
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"Cache-Control": "no-store",
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"Content-Security-Policy": PAGE_POLICY,
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"X-Frame-Options": "DENY",
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...extra,
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};
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}
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