1f75e4797e
Add an opt-in way to broker chat from an operator-supplied OpenCode service instead of the instance the server spawns for itself, and a way to adopt a session that already exists on that endpoint so it appears in chat_sessions and can be continued from the app. - Endpoint selection: the `-opencode-endpoint` server flag (defaulting to `PIPELINES_OPENCODE_ENDPOINT`) opts in; precedence is explicit flag > explicit environment > the endpoint recorded on a previous run, with the spawned instance as the default. opencode.OpenEndpoint validates the reference once (http(s), host, no userinfo/query/fragment/path), detects the backend from its own /api/info (v2) or /global/health (v1) contract, and requires a streamable text/event-stream event path. It owns no process (Close is a no-op) and never calls startServe; every failure names the endpoint and disables chat rather than silently falling back. An authenticated endpoint takes an optional password only through the private file PIPELINES_OPENCODE_ENDPOINT_PASSWORD_FILE, with PIPELINES_OPENCODE_ENDPOINT_USERNAME overriding the detected default. - Persistence: the validated choice is recorded in an additive single-row server_settings table so a restart with no flag/environment reuses it; an unreachable recorded endpoint disables chat with a clear message and no fallback. - chat_adopt: a new protocol request (ChatAdoptRequest) with handleChatAdopt in internal/server/chat.go. It refuses a nil broker/registry/payload and a blank or foreign-shaped id before any endpoint call, reads the endpoint via the shared Chat.Session (which reuses Sessions/decodeChatSessions), records through the existing RecordOperatorSession with the endpoint's directory and title verbatim, and echoes the adopted session plus its registry row like chat_create. A missing id is refused naming the id and records nothing; an endpoint record with an empty directory is refused rather than substituting the server's working directory or home. - CLI: `pipelines chat-adopt <session-id> [--json]` (usage, notes, help inventory, dispatch) with docs/cli.md updated under Chat sessions. - Autostart preserves the endpoint variables (and the password-file reference, never an inline secret) via serviceEnvironmentKeys. Checks before committing: - Package location: the change is user-facing chat behaviour, so the packaged authoring skill reference internal/author/skill/references/operations.md is updated in the same change (Brokered OpenCode chat section) with a dated verification-evidence entry and the not-deployed state. No new reference file is added, so internal/author/install.go's managed inventory is unchanged. - Packaged templates: this repository packages no template set for this behaviour and none references the chat endpoint, so no template needs updating. - Verification: `go build ./...`, `go vet` on the touched packages, `gofmt -l` clean and `go test ./...` all pass. The unit tests cover the endpoint validation/precedence, the adopt happy path and refusals, the recorded endpoint round-trip, the protocol round-trip and the CLI dispatch. The live scratch-server check against the operator's real endpoint was not run in this change. Nothing unrelated is staged; docs left stale (README and other shared documents) are not edited here and are for a single folding writer.
154 lines
6.1 KiB
Go
154 lines
6.1 KiB
Go
package opencode
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"net/url"
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"os"
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"strings"
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"syscall"
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"time"
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)
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// Environment keys for the operator-supplied OpenCode endpoint. The endpoint
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// itself is opt-in: when none of the flag, these variables or the recorded
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// setting is present the server keeps today's spawned default. The password is
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// accepted only through a private file reference (never inline), mirroring the
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// ntfy token-file rule; an optional username overrides the detected default.
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const (
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EndpointEnvKey = "PIPELINES_OPENCODE_ENDPOINT"
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EndpointPasswordFileEnvKey = "PIPELINES_OPENCODE_ENDPOINT_PASSWORD_FILE"
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EndpointUsernameEnvKey = "PIPELINES_OPENCODE_ENDPOINT_USERNAME"
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)
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// endpointProbeTimeout bounds each startup probe (health and SSE) so an
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// unreachable endpoint fails fast instead of hanging server startup.
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const endpointProbeTimeout = 5 * time.Second
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// endpointPasswordFileLimit bounds the credential file read.
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const endpointPasswordFileLimit = 4096
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// ResolveEndpointRef picks the operator's OpenCode endpoint reference by
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// precedence: explicit flag > explicit environment > the endpoint recorded on a
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// previous run. An empty result means no endpoint is configured, so the caller
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// keeps today's spawned-instance default. It is the single precedence resolver
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// used by the server and its tests so the choice cannot drift.
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func ResolveEndpointRef(flagValue, envValue, recorded string) string {
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for _, value := range []string{flagValue, envValue, recorded} {
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if value = strings.TrimSpace(value); value != "" {
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return value
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}
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}
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return ""
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}
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// NormalizeEndpointURL validates an operator-supplied endpoint the way the other
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// endpoint references are validated: an http(s) URL with a non-empty host, no
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// userinfo, no query, no fragment and an empty or "/" path. Anything else is a
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// clear error naming the endpoint rather than a silently guessed base.
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func NormalizeEndpointURL(raw string) (string, error) {
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u, err := url.Parse(strings.TrimSpace(raw))
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if err != nil || u.Hostname() == "" || (u.Scheme != "http" && u.Scheme != "https") ||
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u.User != nil || u.RawQuery != "" || u.Fragment != "" || (u.Path != "" && u.Path != "/") {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid OpenCode endpoint %q: use an http(s) URL with a host and no credentials, query, fragment or path", raw)
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}
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return strings.TrimRight(u.String(), "/"), nil
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}
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// ReadEndpointCredentialFile reads the optional endpoint password from a private
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// file reference, mirroring the ntfy token-file rule: a regular, single-owner
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// 0600 file with a bounded read. An empty path yields no password, so an endpoint
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// that authenticates with the default user only keeps working.
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func ReadEndpointCredentialFile(path string) (string, error) {
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if strings.TrimSpace(path) == "" {
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return "", nil
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}
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info, err := os.Lstat(path)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("cannot read the OpenCode endpoint password file")
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}
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if !info.Mode().IsRegular() || info.Mode().Perm() != 0600 || info.Size() > endpointPasswordFileLimit {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid OpenCode endpoint password file")
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}
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if stat, ok := info.Sys().(*syscall.Stat_t); !ok || stat.Uid != uint32(os.Getuid()) {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("the OpenCode endpoint password file belongs to another user")
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}
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data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("cannot read the OpenCode endpoint password file")
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}
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return strings.TrimSpace(string(data)), nil
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}
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// OpenEndpoint opens an operator-supplied OpenCode endpoint without owning a
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// process: the returned Connection has no owned process (Close is a no-op), so
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// nothing local is ever spawned, and it is never used to reach a different
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// instance. The endpoint reference is validated once here (URL shape, then the
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// backend-specific health contract, then a streamable event path) and every
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// failure names the endpoint; there is no fallback and no retry loop.
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func OpenEndpoint(ctx context.Context, rawURL, password string) (*Connection, error) {
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base, err := NormalizeEndpointURL(rawURL)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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conn := &Connection{
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URL: base,
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password: password,
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username: strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(EndpointUsernameEnvKey)),
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models: map[string]map[string]string{},
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responses: map[string][]byte{},
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}
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probeCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, endpointProbeTimeout)
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defer cancel()
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switch {
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case conn.probeHealth(probeCtx, "v2") == nil:
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conn.Backend = "v2"
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case conn.probeHealth(probeCtx, "v1") == nil:
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conn.Backend = "v1"
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default:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("OpenCode endpoint %s is unreachable or is not an OpenCode service", base)
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}
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// Require a streamable event endpoint before the endpoint is accepted: a
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// healthy service without SSE cannot broker chat, so it is a clear refusal,
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// never a silent fallback to another instance.
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streamCtx, cancelStream := context.WithTimeout(ctx, endpointProbeTimeout)
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defer cancelStream()
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body, err := conn.EventStream(streamCtx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("OpenCode endpoint %s exposes no streamable event endpoint: %w", base, err)
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}
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body.Close()
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return conn, nil
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}
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// probeHealth checks one backend family's readiness contract through the same
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// authenticated request path the adapter uses, so a reachable but unauthorized
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// endpoint is not mistaken for a healthy one. checkHealth and OpenEndpoint share
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// it, so the endpoint contract is defined once.
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func (c *Connection) probeHealth(ctx context.Context, backend string) error {
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previous := c.Backend
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c.Backend = backend
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defer func() { c.Backend = previous }()
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if backend == "v2" {
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info, err := c.nativeRequest(ctx, "get", "/api/info", nil, "")
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var result struct {
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Version string `json:"version"`
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URLs []string `json:"urls"`
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}
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if err != nil || json.Unmarshal(info, &result) != nil || result.Version == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("no V2 info contract")
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}
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return nil
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}
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health, err := c.nativeRequest(ctx, "get", "/global/health", nil, "")
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var result struct {
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Healthy bool `json:"healthy"`
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Version string `json:"version"`
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}
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if err != nil || json.Unmarshal(health, &result) != nil || !result.Healthy || result.Version == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("no native health contract")
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}
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return nil
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}
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