// Zero-dependency static file server + WebSocket proxy for the spike. // node serve.mjs [--port 8090] [--host 0.0.0.0] [--pipelines 127.0.0.1:8080] // // Serves this directory, proxies GET/Upgrade /connect and GET/HEAD /artifacts/ to // the Pipelines server, so the page, the WebSocket and artifact files share one // origin. The API and its artifacts live on the server's port; the page is served // from another, so artifact URLs resolved against the page would 404 without this. // // Why the proxy exists: internal/server/websocket.go calls // `websocket.Accept(w, r, nil)` (github.com/coder/websocket), which rejects an // upgrade whose Origin host does not match the request Host — a browser would // get 403 from a cross-origin page (a Node/curl client sends no Origin and is // unaffected, which is why the smoke test passes). Proxying makes the page // same-origin, and the Origin header is dropped on the way through because the // server has no authentication and needs none. // // The default host is 127.0.0.1. Use --host 0.0.0.0 only on a trusted LAN/VPN. import { createServer, request } from "node:http"; import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto"; import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { homedir } from "node:os"; import { readFile, stat } from "node:fs/promises"; import { extname, join, normalize, resolve, sep } from "node:path"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; import net from "node:net"; import { sameOriginUpgrade } from "./src/proxySecurity.js"; const ROOT = resolve(fileURLToPath(new URL(".", import.meta.url))); // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Access control // // The proxy can be reached from a tailnet, so it refuses to serve anything // without a session cookie. The password and cookie secret live in a 0600 file // outside the repository; tests may disable the gate explicitly. // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- const AUTH_DISABLED = process.env.PIPELINES_WEB_AUTH === "disabled"; const AUTH_FILE = process.env.PIPELINES_WEB_AUTH_FILE ?? join(homedir(), ".config", "pipelines", "web-auth.json"); const SESSION_COOKIE = "pipelines_session"; function loadAuth() { if (AUTH_DISABLED) return null; try { const parsed = JSON.parse(readFileSync(AUTH_FILE, "utf8")); if ( typeof parsed.password === "string" && parsed.password.length >= 8 && typeof parsed.secret === "string" && parsed.secret.length >= 32 ) { return { password: parsed.password, secret: parsed.secret }; } } catch { // Fall through to the refusal below. } console.error( `web auth: refusing to start without ${AUTH_FILE} (or PIPELINES_WEB_AUTH=disabled for tests)`, ); process.exit(1); } const auth = loadAuth(); function cookieValue(req, name) { for (const part of String(req.headers.cookie ?? "").split(";")) { const i = part.indexOf("="); if (i < 0) continue; if (part.slice(0, i).trim() === name) { try { return decodeURIComponent(part.slice(i + 1).trim()); } catch { return ""; } } } return ""; } function signSession(expires) { return `${expires}.${createHmac("sha256", auth.secret).update(String(expires)).digest("base64url")}`; } const SESSION_LONG_SECONDS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60; const SESSION_SHORT_SECONDS = 12 * 60 * 60; function sessionToken(remember = false) { const ttl = remember ? SESSION_LONG_SECONDS : SESSION_SHORT_SECONDS; return signSession(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + ttl); } function validSession(value) { if (!auth || typeof value !== "string") return false; const [expires, signature] = value.split("."); if (!expires || !signature) return false; const expected = createHmac("sha256", auth.secret).update(expires).digest(); let given; try { given = Buffer.from(signature, "base64url"); } catch { return false; } if (given.length !== expected.length || !timingSafeEqual(given, expected)) return false; return Number(expires) > Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000); } function isAuthed(req) { return !auth || validSession(cookieValue(req, SESSION_COOKIE)); } function passwordOk(candidate) { if (!auth) return true; const given = Buffer.from(String(candidate ?? "")); const expected = Buffer.from(auth.password); return given.length === expected.length && timingSafeEqual(given, expected); } function sessionCookie(req, remember = false) { // Lax, not Strict: launching the installed app or a link from another app is // a top-level navigation, and a Strict cookie is withheld on that first // request, which made a remembered session look forgotten. Lax still keeps // the cookie off cross-site subresource and POST requests. const bits = [`${SESSION_COOKIE}=${sessionToken(remember)}`, "Path=/", "HttpOnly", "SameSite=Lax"]; // Remember me persists the cookie; otherwise it is a browser-session cookie // (and the signed token itself expires after 12 hours). if (remember) { const expires = new Date(Date.now() + SESSION_LONG_SECONDS * 1000).toUTCString(); bits.push(`Max-Age=${SESSION_LONG_SECONDS}`, `Expires=${expires}`); } // Tailscale terminates TLS and usually forwards the scheme; when it does, the // cookie is Secure. A direct plain-http LAN visit still works without it. const forwarded = String(req.headers["x-forwarded-proto"] ?? "").split(",")[0].trim(); if (forwarded === "https") bits.push("Secure"); return bits.join("; "); } /** Small per-address brake on password guessing. */ const loginFailures = new Map(); function loginBlocked(address) { const entry = loginFailures.get(address); return Boolean(entry && entry.until > Date.now()); } function noteLoginFailure(address) { const now = Date.now(); const entry = loginFailures.get(address) ?? { count: 0, until: 0 }; entry.count += 1; if (entry.count >= 8) { entry.count = 0; entry.until = now + 30_000; } loginFailures.set(address, entry); } function safeNext(value) { const next = String(value ?? ""); return next.startsWith("/") && !next.startsWith("//") ? next : "/"; } function loginPage({ next = "/", error = "" } = {}) { return ` Pipelines · sign in

Pipelines

Sign in to reach this server.

${error ? `

${error}

` : ""}

Remembered sessions last 30 days; otherwise the sign-in ends when the browser closes.

`; } function readRequestBody(req, limit = 4096) { return new Promise((resolveBody, rejectBody) => { let size = 0; const chunks = []; req.on("data", (chunk) => { size += chunk.length; if (size > limit) { rejectBody(new Error("request too large")); req.destroy(); return; } chunks.push(chunk); }); req.on("end", () => resolveBody(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString("utf8"))); req.on("error", rejectBody); }); } const MIME = { ".html": "text/html; charset=utf-8", ".js": "text/javascript; charset=utf-8", ".mjs": "text/javascript; charset=utf-8", ".css": "text/css; charset=utf-8", ".json": "application/json; charset=utf-8", ".svg": "image/svg+xml", ".webmanifest": "application/manifest+json", ".png": "image/png", ".ico": "image/x-icon", ".map": "application/json; charset=utf-8", }; // A path is asset-looking when its last segment ends in a known file type, and a // page route when its first segment names one of the client's destinations. A // stage key may itself end in an extension (`plan.js`): under a page prefix the // route still serves the shell, while an asset-looking path elsewhere (`/nope.js`) // stays an honest 404 and a real file (`/src/app.js`) is still served. const ASSET_EXTENSIONS = new Set([...Object.keys(MIME), ".woff", ".woff2", ".txt"]); const PAGE_PREFIXES = new Set(["pipelines", "runs", "chat", "settings", "templates"]); /** The decoded first path segment, or "" for the root. */ function firstSegment(pathname) { const raw = pathname.split("/").filter(Boolean)[0] ?? ""; try { return decodeURIComponent(raw); } catch { return raw; } } function flag(argv, name, fallback) { const i = argv.indexOf(name); if (i !== -1 && argv[i + 1]) return argv[i + 1]; return fallback; } function parsePort(argv) { return Number(flag(argv, "--port", process.env.PORT ?? 8090)); } /** * Resolve a request path to a file inside ROOT. Returns null when the percent * escapes are malformed (a guarded decode, so a bad `%` cannot throw out of the * request handler) and false when the path escapes ROOT; the caller treats the * first as an unknown page route and the second as forbidden. */ function resolvePath(urlPath) { let decoded; try { decoded = decodeURIComponent(urlPath.split("?")[0]); } catch { return null; } const rel = normalize(decoded).replace(/^([/\\])+/, ""); const target = resolve(join(ROOT, rel || "index.html")); if (target !== ROOT && !target.startsWith(ROOT + sep)) return false; return target; } /** Send index.html (the page shell). The router reads the real URL in the browser. */ async function serveIndex(res) { const html = await readFile(join(ROOT, "index.html"), "utf8"); // A deep URL such as /runs/440 would otherwise resolve the shell's relative // `./src/app.js` against /runs/. A root keeps the shell's own asset URLs // absolute without changing the address bar (and without editing index.html). const body = html.replace(//i, '\n '); res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": MIME[".html"], "Cache-Control": "no-store", }); res.end(body); } /** * Proxy one artifact request to the Pipelines server. Artifact URLs are resolved * against the configured server, which in a proxied deployment is the page's own * origin, so without this the gallery's thumbnails, the viewer and the session * export would all 404 while the WebSocket worked. */ function proxyArtifact(req, res) { const headers = { ...req.headers }; delete headers.origin; headers.host = `${targetHost}:${targetPort}`; const upstream = request( { host: targetHost, port: targetPort, method: req.method, path: req.url, headers }, (reply) => { res.writeHead(reply.statusCode ?? 502, reply.headers); reply.pipe(res); }, ); upstream.on("error", () => { if (!res.headersSent) res.writeHead(502, { "Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8" }); res.end("Artifact unavailable"); }); req.pipe(upstream); } const server = createServer(async (req, res) => { const pathname = (req.url ?? "/").split("?")[0]; if (auth) { // Brand assets are public so the sign-in page itself can show the app icon. if ( req.method === "GET" && (pathname === "/favicon.svg" || pathname === "/apple-touch-icon.png") ) { // fall through to the static handler below } else if (pathname === "/login" && req.method === "GET") { if (isAuthed(req)) { res.writeHead(302, { Location: "/" }).end(); return; } const next = new URL(req.url ?? "/login", "http://localhost").searchParams.get("next") ?? "/"; res .writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": "text/html; charset=utf-8", "Cache-Control": "no-store" }) .end(loginPage({ next: safeNext(next) })); return; } else if (pathname === "/login" && req.method === "POST") { const body = await readRequestBody(req).catch(() => ""); const fields = new URLSearchParams(body); const address = req.socket.remoteAddress ?? ""; if (loginBlocked(address)) { res .writeHead(429, { "Content-Type": "text/html; charset=utf-8", "Cache-Control": "no-store" }) .end(loginPage({ error: "Too many attempts. Wait 30 seconds." })); return; } if (!passwordOk(fields.get("password"))) { noteLoginFailure(address); res .writeHead(401, { "Content-Type": "text/html; charset=utf-8", "Cache-Control": "no-store" }) .end(loginPage({ next: safeNext(fields.get("next")), error: "Wrong password." })); return; } const remember = fields.get("remember") === "on"; res.setHeader("Set-Cookie", sessionCookie(req, remember)); res.writeHead(303, { Location: safeNext(fields.get("next")) }).end(); return; } else if (pathname === "/logout") { res.setHeader("Set-Cookie", `${SESSION_COOKIE}=; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict; Max-Age=0`); res.writeHead(303, { Location: "/login" }).end(); return; } else if (!isAuthed(req)) { const wantsHtml = String(req.headers.accept ?? "").includes("text/html"); if (req.method === "GET" && wantsHtml) { res.writeHead(302, { Location: `/login?next=${encodeURIComponent(req.url ?? "/")}` }).end(); return; } res .writeHead(401, { "Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8", "Cache-Control": "no-store" }) .end("Sign in required\n"); return; } } if (pathname.startsWith("/artifacts/")) { proxyArtifact(req, res); return; } if (pathname === "/favicon.ico") { res.writeHead(204).end(); // no icon; keeps the console free of a 404 return; } // SPA fallback: a page route (`/runs/440`, `/pipelines/24/5/stage/plan.js`) or a // non-asset GET serves the shell, so a hard navigation deep-links and the client // router opens the destination. A path that looks like an asset outside a page // prefix (`.js`, `.css`, `.png`, …) stays an honest 404, and a malformed escape // is handled like any other unknown path rather than rejecting the handler. const assetLike = ASSET_EXTENSIONS.has(extname(pathname).toLowerCase()); const pageLike = PAGE_PREFIXES.has(firstSegment(pathname)); const serveShell = pageLike || !assetLike; const target = resolvePath(req.url ?? "/"); if (target === null) { // A malformed percent escape is an unknown page route, not a handler throw. if (serveShell) { await serveIndex(res).catch(() => { res.writeHead(404, { "Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8" }).end("Not found"); }); return; } res.writeHead(404, { "Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8" }).end("Not found"); return; } if (!target) { res.writeHead(403).end("Forbidden"); return; } try { let path = target; const info = await stat(path).catch(() => null); if (info?.isDirectory()) path = join(path, "index.html"); const body = await readFile(path); res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": MIME[extname(path)] ?? "application/octet-stream", "Cache-Control": "no-store", }); res.end(body); } catch { if (serveShell) { await serveIndex(res).catch(() => { res.writeHead(404, { "Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8" }).end("Not found"); }); return; } res.writeHead(404, { "Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8" }).end("Not found"); } }); // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // WebSocket proxy for /connect // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- const pipelinesTarget = flag( process.argv, "--pipelines", process.env.PIPELINES_TARGET ?? "127.0.0.1:8080", ); const targetPort = Number(pipelinesTarget.split(":").at(-1)); const targetHost = pipelinesTarget.slice(0, pipelinesTarget.lastIndexOf(":")) || "127.0.0.1"; function proxyUpgrade(req, clientSocket, clientHead) { const upstream = net.connect(targetPort, targetHost, () => { const headers = { ...req.headers }; delete headers.origin; // see the header comment: the server forbids a mismatched Origin headers.host = `${targetHost}:${targetPort}`; const block = Object.entries(headers) .filter(([, v]) => v != null) .map(([k, v]) => `${k}: ${Array.isArray(v) ? v.join(", ") : v}`) .join("\r\n"); upstream.write(`GET ${req.url} HTTP/1.1\r\n${block}\r\n\r\n`); if (clientHead?.length) upstream.write(clientHead); upstream.pipe(clientSocket); clientSocket.pipe(upstream); }); upstream.on("error", () => clientSocket.destroy()); clientSocket.on("error", () => upstream.destroy()); } server.on("upgrade", (req, clientSocket, clientHead) => { const pathname = (req.url ?? "").split("?")[0]; if (!sameOriginUpgrade(req.headers.origin, req.headers.host)) { clientSocket.write("HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\r\nConnection: close\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\n\r\n"); clientSocket.destroy(); return; } if (auth && !isAuthed(req)) { clientSocket.write("HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\r\nConnection: close\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\n\r\n"); clientSocket.destroy(); return; } if (pathname !== "/connect") { clientSocket.destroy(); return; } proxyUpgrade(req, clientSocket, clientHead); }); const port = parsePort(process.argv); const host = flag(process.argv, "--host", "127.0.0.1"); server.listen(port, host, () => { const shown = host === "0.0.0.0" ? "127.0.0.1" : host; console.log(`web spike: http://${shown}:${port}/ (bound ${host}:${port})`); console.log(`proxying /connect (ws) and /artifacts/ (http) -> ${targetHost}:${targetPort}`); console.log(auth ? "auth: sign-in required" : "auth: DISABLED (tests)"); });