Store a scrypt hash (migrating a plaintext password without changing it),
sign sessions with a generation that ./password and --revoke-all rotate,
make logout a same-origin POST that revokes the token, add sign out everywhere,
and close proxied websockets whose session ends. Enforce a strength rule for
new passwords, back off logins per client and server-wide, check Origin on
login, tighten next, add security headers and a __Host- cookie over https.
The proxy adds the shared token to every upstream request and drops any
client copy. The peer relay accepts only tailnet, LAN, ts.net and discovered
hosts, resolves each name once and pins the checked address, and flags
ws:// endpoints with insecure_transport.
The direct proxy already forwards every /files method behind the sign-in
gate; the peer relay now allows POST /files beside /chat-uploads. Tests cover
the name header, body and refusal of other POST targets.