Hash the web password and revoke sessions server-side

Store a scrypt hash (migrating a plaintext password without changing it),
sign sessions with a generation that ./password and --revoke-all rotate,
make logout a same-origin POST that revokes the token, add sign out everywhere,
and close proxied websockets whose session ends. Enforce a strength rule for
new passwords, back off logins per client and server-wide, check Origin on
login, tighten next, add security headers and a __Host- cookie over https.
This commit is contained in:
2026-11-10 01:21:28 +00:00
parent f11ff8650d
commit e43f9fa50c
17 changed files with 1353 additions and 125 deletions
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// Browser-facing hygiene for the proxy: request origin checks, the post-login
// redirect target, the session cookie's name and the security headers.
import { sameOriginUpgrade } from "./proxySecurity.js";
export const SESSION_COOKIE = "pipelines_session";
/** Over https the cookie is host-locked (Secure, Path=/, no Domain). */
export const HOST_SESSION_COOKIE = "__Host-pipelines_session";
/** Whether the browser reached the proxy over https (Tailscale serve). */
export function isHttps(req) {
const forwarded = String(req.headers["x-forwarded-proto"] ?? "").split(",")[0].trim().toLowerCase();
return forwarded === "https" || Boolean(req.socket?.encrypted);
}
export function sessionCookieName(req) {
return isHttps(req) ? HOST_SESSION_COOKIE : SESSION_COOKIE;
}
/**
* Whether a state-changing request comes from this origin. Browsers send
* Origin on every POST; a native client (the app, curl, a peer proxy) sends
* none and has no ambient cookies to abuse. `Origin: null` and a cross-site
* Sec-Fetch-Site are refused.
*/
export function sameOriginRequest(req) {
const origin = req.headers.origin;
const site = req.headers["sec-fetch-site"];
if (site && !["same-origin", "none"].includes(String(site))) return false;
if (origin === undefined) return true;
return sameOriginUpgrade(origin, req.headers.host);
}
/**
* The local path to return to after signing in: one "/" followed by anything
* but "/" or "\" (which browsers treat as another host), no backslashes or
* control characters anywhere, else "/".
*/
export function safeNext(value) {
const next = String(value ?? "");
if (next.length > 2048 || !/^\/(?![/\\])/.test(next) || /[\\\u0000-\u001f\u007f]/.test(next)) return "/";
return next;
}
/** The proxy's own pages (sign-in, sign-out) are never framed and run no script. */
export const PAGE_POLICY =
"default-src 'none'; img-src 'self'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; form-action 'self'; " +
"frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'none'";
/**
* Headers every response starts with. The app frames only its own documents
* (sandboxed srcdoc HTML previews), so same-origin framing stays allowed; a
* response that sets its own value (for example a sandboxing CSP) overrides
* these at writeHead. HSTS only on https.
*/
export function applySecurityHeaders(req, res) {
res.setHeader("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff");
res.setHeader("Referrer-Policy", "same-origin");
res.setHeader("X-Frame-Options", "SAMEORIGIN");
res.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", "frame-ancestors 'self'");
if (isHttps(req)) res.setHeader("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=31536000");
}
/** Marks a response as one of the proxy's own pages. */
export function pageHeaders(extra = {}) {
return {
"Content-Type": "text/html; charset=utf-8",
"Cache-Control": "no-store",
"Content-Security-Policy": PAGE_POLICY,
"X-Frame-Options": "DENY",
...extra,
};
}