diff --git a/web/src/peerRelay.js b/web/src/peerRelay.js
index d0fcf58c..48bf40c2 100644
--- a/web/src/peerRelay.js
+++ b/web/src/peerRelay.js
@@ -7,6 +7,11 @@ import {
} from "./peerTransport.js";
import { PeerRegistry } from "./peerRegistry.js";
+// Peer files are untrusted content, never privileged control-UI documents.
+// Apply this even for older peers whose /files endpoint has no sandbox header.
+const contentPolicy =
+ "sandbox; default-src 'none'; script-src 'none'; connect-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; media-src 'self' data:; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'";
+
const allowed = (path) =>
path === "/files" ||
path === "/chat-uploads" ||
@@ -75,7 +80,18 @@ export class PeerRelay extends PeerRegistry {
response.statusCode >= 300 && response.statusCode < 400
? 502
: response.statusCode,
- { ...safe, "Cache-Control": "no-store" },
+ {
+ ...safe,
+ "Cache-Control": "private, no-store",
+ // Multiple CSP policies intersect: preserve a peer's stricter
+ // restrictions while always imposing the local sandbox boundary.
+ "Content-Security-Policy": response.headers[
+ "content-security-policy"
+ ]
+ ? [response.headers["content-security-policy"], contentPolicy]
+ : contentPolicy,
+ "X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
+ },
);
response.pipe(res);
});
diff --git a/web/test/peerRelay.test.mjs b/web/test/peerRelay.test.mjs
index 210995a0..6cee5a8c 100644
--- a/web/test/peerRelay.test.mjs
+++ b/web/test/peerRelay.test.mjs
@@ -76,6 +76,25 @@ async function fixture(t) {
return;
}
res.setHeader("Set-Cookie", "do-not-forward=private");
+ if (
+ req.url.startsWith("/artifacts/") ||
+ req.url.includes("untrusted.svg")
+ ) {
+ res.setHeader(
+ "Content-Type",
+ req.url.startsWith("/artifacts/") ? "text/html" : "image/svg+xml",
+ );
+ if (req.url.startsWith("/artifacts/")) {
+ res.setHeader(
+ "Content-Security-Policy",
+ "sandbox; default-src 'none'; img-src 'none'",
+ );
+ }
+ res.end(
+ '',
+ );
+ return;
+ }
res.end(
JSON.stringify({ name, url: req.url, cookie: req.headers.cookie }),
);
@@ -469,3 +488,44 @@ test("expired registry owners are closed and pruned before the capacity check",
registry.forget({ token: "unknown-invalid-session" });
assert.equal(registry.sessions.size, before);
});
+
+test("raw peer HTML and legacy SVG files retain a local sandbox and no cookie authority", async (t) => {
+ const f = await fixture(t);
+ await f.register("one", {
+ endpoints: [f.remotes[0]],
+ password: "password-one",
+ });
+ for (const path of [
+ "/artifacts/7/2/raw.html",
+ "/files?path=%2Fhome%2Funtrusted.svg",
+ ]) {
+ const response = await fetch(f.base + "/peers/one" + path, {
+ headers: { Cookie: f.cookie },
+ });
+ assert.equal(response.status, 200);
+ const policy = response.headers.get("content-security-policy");
+ for (const directive of [
+ "sandbox;",
+ "default-src 'none'",
+ "script-src 'none'",
+ "connect-src 'none'",
+ "base-uri 'none'",
+ "form-action 'none'",
+ "frame-ancestors 'self'",
+ ]) {
+ assert.ok(policy.includes(directive), directive);
+ }
+ assert.equal(policy.includes("allow-same-origin"), false);
+ assert.equal(policy.includes("allow-scripts"), false);
+ assert.equal(response.headers.get("x-content-type-options"), "nosniff");
+ assert.equal(response.headers.get("cache-control"), "private, no-store");
+ assert.equal(response.headers.get("set-cookie"), null);
+ if (path.startsWith("/artifacts/"))
+ assert.ok(
+ policy.includes("img-src 'none'"),
+ "stricter remote policy preserved",
+ );
+ // The response boundary, not text rewriting, isolates generated documents.
+ assert.match(await response.text(), /