Guard the Go server's request boundary: loopback Host, no Origin on /connect, shared token
The server answered any Host, so a DNS-rebinding page reached /connect (101) and could drive terminals. Every route now refuses a non-loopback Host on a loopback connection (421), /connect refuses any Origin (403), and a server started with -token-file requires X-Pipelines-Token (401; /mcp and /healthz exempt). The CLI/TUI send the token only to loopback URLs.
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@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ type Options struct {
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// them so they never share the real server's tmux sessions.
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TerminalTmuxSocket string
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TerminalWithoutTmux bool
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// AccessToken, when set, is required on every request (servertoken.Header)
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// except the chat-tools MCP endpoint and /healthz (request_boundary.go).
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AccessToken string
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}
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// Handler serves the persistent connection with default options. Canceling ctx
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@@ -576,7 +579,7 @@ func HandlerWithOptions(ctx context.Context, options Options, stores ...*pipelin
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// runner's collaborators are wired and before any request is served.
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runs.reattachRuns()
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}
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return &runHandler{Handler: mux, runner: runs, hub: hub}
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return &runHandler{Handler: guardRequests(mux, options.AccessToken), runner: runs, hub: hub}
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}
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type runHandler struct {
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