stage: retry pre-admission harness reach failures and widen repair deadline

Treat a failure to reach the harness before any prompt or tool call is
admitted (connecting or creating the session) as a distinct retryable
reach failure, so a transport blip at the first stage no longer ends a
mutating run; keep post-admission readback/poll/agent failures retried
only on an explicit read-only stage and never replay admitted tool work.
Preserve the true cause when the context is already done (join ctx.Err
with the typed transport error) and report a sanitized unknown provider
error name/status instead of a blanket summary.

Make the isolated format-repair deadline proportional to the stage
timeout (floored, capped and clamped to remaining minus a margin) so a
slow-but-repairable result is recovered without ever extending the stage
deadline; the bounded ladder, value guard, deny-all formatter session,
cumulative usage accounting and no-tool-replay rule are unchanged.

Update docs/model-results.md, docs/pipeline-performance-review.md and the
packaged skill references; add stage, opencode and server fixtures.
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-17 14:51:09 +01:00
parent 5adc961f88
commit 7b72b8f20f
15 changed files with 563 additions and 63 deletions
+23
View File
@@ -90,3 +90,26 @@ func TestNativeStructuredFailureIsClearAndDoesNotReplayGeneration(t *testing.T)
t.Fatal("wait failure discarded provider response", err, string(retained))
}
}
// TestExecutionErrorReportsSanitizedNameAndStatusWithoutBody proves an
// unrecognized provider error name is reported as a bounded, safe identifier
// plus any HTTP status instead of a blanket summary, while no provider message,
// prompt or credential is copied and known names keep their exact wording.
func TestExecutionErrorReportsSanitizedNameAndStatusWithoutBody(t *testing.T) {
err := ExecutionError(json.RawMessage(`{"name":"TotallyUnknownError","data":{"statusCode":502,"message":"secret provider body"}}`))
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "TotallyUnknownError") || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "HTTP 502") {
t.Fatalf("unknown error name/status not reported: %v", err)
}
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "secret provider body") {
t.Fatalf("diagnostic leaked the provider body: %v", err)
}
if err := ExecutionError(json.RawMessage(`{"_tag":"SomeTagError"}`)); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "SomeTagError") {
t.Fatalf("unknown tag not reported: %v", err)
}
if err := ExecutionError(json.RawMessage(`{"name":"Injected Error: Bearer secret-token"}`)); err == nil || strings.Contains(err.Error(), "secret-token") || strings.Contains(err.Error(), "Bearer") || err.Error() != "OpenCode agent reported an execution error" {
t.Fatalf("unsafe name was copied into the diagnostic: %v", err)
}
if err := ExecutionError(json.RawMessage(`{"name":"APIError","data":{"statusCode":500}}`)); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "APIError (HTTP 500)") {
t.Fatalf("known safe name changed: %v", err)
}
}